Conceptualisation in reference production:Probabilistic modelling and experimental testing by van-Gompel, Rutger et al.
                                                                    
University of Dundee
Conceptualisation in reference production
van-Gompel, Rutger; van Deemter, Kees; Gatt, Albert; Snoeren, Rick; Krahmer, Emiel
Published in:
Psychological Review
Publication date:
2019
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
van-Gompel, R., van Deemter, K., Gatt, A., Snoeren, R., & Krahmer, E. (2019). Conceptualisation in reference
production: Probabilistic modelling and experimental testing. Psychological Review, 126(3), 345-373.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from Discovery Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 24. Nov. 2019
Conceptualisation in reference production:  
Probabilistic modelling and experimental testing 
Roger P.G. van Gompel 
Kees van Deemter 
Albert Gatt 
Rick Snoeren 
Emiel Krahmer 
Author Note 
Roger P.G. van Gompel, School of Social Sciences, University of Dundee; Kees van 
Deemter, Department of Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University; Albert 
Gatt, Institute of Linguistics and Language Technology, University of Malta; Rick Snoeren, 
Axians Performance Solutions; Emiel Krahmer, Tilburg center for Cognition and 
Communication (TiCC), Tilburg University. 
Parts of this work were previously reported at Architectures and Mechanisms of 
Language Processing (AMLaP) in 2012 (Riva del Garda) and 2016 (Bilbao), at the PRE-
Cogsci meeting in 2013 (Berlin) and at REFNET Round Table Event 2016 (Aberdeen). 
Address all correspondence to Roger van Gompel, Psychology, School of Social 
Sciences, University of Dundee, Dundee, DD1 4HN, Scotland, United Kingdom. Contact: 
r.p.g.vangompel@dundee.ac.uk
Manuscript ©American Psychological Association, 2018. This paper is not the copy of record and may not exactly 
replicate the authoritative document published in the APA journal. Please do not copy or cite without author's 
permission. The final article is available, upon publication, at: https://psycnet.apa.org/doi/10.1037/rev0000138
CONCEPTUALISATION IN REFERENCE PRODUCTION 2 
 
Abstract 
In psycholinguistics, there has been relatively little work investigating conceptualisation –
how speakers decide which concepts to express. This contrasts with work in natural language 
generation (NLG), a subfield of AI, where much research has explored content determination 
during the generation of referring expressions. Existing NLG algorithms for 
conceptualisation during reference production do not fully explain previous psycholinguistic 
results, so we developed new models that we tested in three language production 
experiments. 
In our experiments, participants described target objects to another participant. In 
Experiment 1, either its size, its colour, or both its size and colour distinguished the target 
from all distractor objects; in Experiment 2, either colour, type or both colour and type 
distinguished it from all distractors; In Experiment 3, either colour, size or the border around 
the object distinguished the target. We tested how well the different models fit the 
distribution of description types (e.g., “small candle”, “grey candle”, “small grey candle”) 
that participants produced. 
 Across these experiments, the PRO model provided the best fit. In this model, 
speakers first choose a property that rules out all distractors. If there is more than one such 
property, then they probabilistically choose one based on a preference for that property. Next, 
they sometimes add another property, with the probability again determined by its preference 
and speakers’ eagerness to overspecify.  
 
Keywords: Reference production; referring expressions; conceptualisation; overspecification; 
computational models.  
CONCEPTUALISATION IN REFERENCE PRODUCTION 3 
 
Disclosures and acknowledgements 
RvG acknowledges support from ESRC award ES/P001866/1. AG and EK received financial 
support from The Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research, via a Vici Grant (NWO 
Grant 27770007). KvD was supported by the RefNet project (EPSRC award EP/J019615/1). 
All authors contributed significantly to the design of the experiments, the modelling, 
analyses, interpretation of the data and the writing. 
None of the authors have any conflicts of interest that that may have inappropriately 
impacted or influenced the research and interpretation of the findings. 
We would like to thank Ben Vincent for his suggestions on Bayesian model testing, as 
well as Jenna Lyons and Manon Yassa for their help with the experiments. 
  
CONCEPTUALISATION IN REFERENCE PRODUCTION 4 
 
Conceptualisation in reference production:  
Probabilistic modelling and experimental testing 
 
Human speech production — going from “intention to articulation” (Levelt, 1989), or from 
“mind to mouth” (Bock, 1995) — is a complex process, yet our understanding of it is 
increasing (Goldrick, Ferreira, & Miozzo, 2014). Many researchers agree that speech 
production involves different stages (e.g., Dell, 1986; Garrett, 1984; Levelt, 1989; Levelt, 
Roelofs, Meyer, 1999; Vigliocco & Hartsuiker, 2002). A speaker first has to decide what she 
wants to say1, a decision referred to as conceptual preparation or conceptualisation, which 
results in a preverbal message. The second stage, often referred to as formulation, involves 
lexical access and planning of the structure of the utterance. Finally, during phonological 
encoding, the utterance plan is phonologically encoded and articulated.  
 Most experimental studies and psycholinguistic models have concentrated on the last 
two stages of speech production, and as a result these are better understood than the first, 
conceptualisation stage. It is interesting, however, that conceptualisation is an important 
research topic in a different field, known as natural language generation (NLG, see e.g., Gatt 
& Krahmer, 2018; Mellish et al., 2006; Reiter & Dale, 2000). NLG is a subdomain of 
Artificial Intelligence dedicated to the automatic conversion of data into text. The goal of the 
current paper is to see whether NLG conceptualisation algorithms can further our 
understanding of how human speakers conceptualise their utterances. 
 One NLG area in which conceptualisation has been intensively studied is the generation 
of referring expressions, especially noun phrase descriptions of objects, such as “the grey 
candle”. This line of work dates back at least to Winograd (1972), and more systematically, 
from Appelt (1985) onwards (see Krahmer & Van Deemter, 2012, and Van Deemter 2016 for 
recent discussions). The focus on such descriptions is understandable, given that reference 
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has been argued to be central to communication (Johnson-Laird, 1983). NLG reference 
generation systems usually distinguish between content determination and linguistic 
realisation, similar to the distinction between conceptualisation and formulation in 
psycholinguistic models. During the content determination phase, the NLG system decides 
which attributes of a referent (like its colour, size or type)2 to include in the description. Next, 
during realisation, it decides how to express selected attributes in words and phrases. NLG 
models have often focused on the selection of attributes in full noun phrases that aim to 
single out the target from its distractors in one go (one-shot descriptions), and this is what we 
shall do in this paper as well. 
 Here, we ask to what extent these NLG models can serve as a stepping-stone 
towards computational models of human conceptualisation during the production of referring 
expressions. As we will demonstrate, it is possible to derive from NLG models precise, 
quantitative predictions about the referring expressions that humans produce. We contrast the 
predictions of different NLG models in a set of language production experiments, to further 
our understanding of human conceptualisation of reference production. 
 
Computational Models of Conceptualisation in Reference 
Computational models of content selection address language production from an applied 
perspective, in the context of larger NLG systems that automatically convert data into text 
(Mellish et al., 2006; Reiter & Dale, 2000). Such systems are useful in the automatic 
generation of, for example, textual weather reports (Goldberg, Driedger, & Kittredge, 1994), 
and summaries of patient information in intensive care (Portet et al., 2009). 
 Typically, content selection models determine which set of properties distinguishes a 
target object from the distractors in a given domain, assuming that we know the relevant 
properties of the domain objects. For example, a content selection model has to determine 
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which properties to select to refer to a target such as the circled object in Fig. 1 in order to 
distinguish it from its distractors (i.e., the two other objects); it could either select the 
property “red” or “small” (or both) for inclusion in the referring expression. In many cases, 
NLG algorithms start from handcrafted domain models, but in recent years they increasingly 
start from raw images (e.g., Kazemzadeh, Ordonez, Matten, & Berg, 2014; Mao et al., 2016).  
_______________________________ 
Insert Fig. 1 about here 
_______________________________ 
 Early NLG models of content selection. Algorithms differ primarily in the way they 
decide on the inclusion of attributes. In early NLG models, the focus was on computing the 
shortest possible distinguishing description that distinguishes the target from all its 
distractors. This is in line with Grice’s (1975) influential maxim of quantity, which states that 
speakers should make their contribution as informative as required but not more informative. 
The full brevity algorithm (Dale, 1989), for example, first checks whether there is a single 
property of the target that rules out all distractors. If this fails, it considers all possible 
combinations of two properties, and so on. Unfortunately, this approach suffers from two 
problems, making it less suitable as a psycholinguistic model of conceptualization. First, it is 
computationally expensive, which implies that producing a description could take a long time 
in larger domains and for longer descriptions (Appelt, 1985; Dale, 1989; Dale & Reiter, 
1995). Although this would not be an issue with a small number of attributes and distractors 
(as in many psycholinguistic experiments), it would face difficulties with more complex 
scenes. Second, the algorithm never produces overspecified descriptions, that is, descriptions 
that include more properties than necessary for unique identification of the target. An 
example of this is “small red broom” in Fig. 1.  
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 There is much evidence from psycholinguistic experiments that human speakers often 
produce overspecified descriptions. For example, Pechmann (1989) asked speakers to refer to 
a target object (a car, ball or chair, for example) among three, five or seven distractors, 
differing in their type, colour and/or size. Pechmann found that while only 4% of the 
descriptions speakers produced were underspecified, 21% of the descriptions included at least 
one property that was not required for identification by the addressee. Others report 
comparable low levels of underspecification (e.g., Koolen, Gatt, Goudbeek & Krahmer, 
2011). Percentages of overspecified descriptions vary from one study to the next, but are 
always substantial. Pechmann (1989), as noted above, reported 21% overspecified 
descriptions, but other studies found percentages between 40% and 80% (e.g., Koolen, 
Goudbeek, & Krahmer, 2013; Engelhardt, Bailey, & Ferreira, 2006; Engelhardt, Demiral, & 
Ferreira, 2011; Maes, Arts, & Noordman, 2004, Tarenskeen, Broersma, & Geurts, 2015). 
Several factors may influence the rate of overspecification, for instance, speakers are more 
likely to overspecify in situations where misunderstandings would be costly (Arts, 2004; 
Arts, Maes, Noordman, & Jansen, 2011), when instructions make participants aware of 
potential communication breakdown (Rubio-Fernandez, 2016), when domains are spatially 
complex (Paraboni & Van Deemter, 2014), and when the distractors in the scene are more 
varied (e.g., they differ in type or colour, Koolen et al., 2013; Rubio-Fernandez, 2016). 
 Another early content determination model is the greedy heuristic algorithm (Dale, 
1989, 1992). This algorithm selects attributes based on how many distractors they rule out, 
which is usually referred to as the discriminatory power or utility of an attribute. The 
algorithm iteratively selects that property which rules out most of the distractors not 
previously ruled out, incrementally extending the description based on what property has 
most discriminatory power at each stage. It has a number of interesting properties from a 
psycholinguistic perspective. First, it may give rise to overspecified descriptions because it is 
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incremental: When a property (e.g., colour) becomes redundant following the selection of a 
later property (e.g., size), the initial property cannot be “unselected”. Note that this notion of 
incrementality is different from that at the surface, word level: Although colour may be 
selected before size, this does not mean that colour information is necessarily realised before 
size at the word level. In addition, since the algorithm does not try to compute the shortest 
possible description, it is computationally considerably more efficient than the full brevity 
algorithm (Dale & Reiter, 1995). A limitation of the model is that ties are not resolved: 
applying the standard greedy algorithm to the example in Fig. 1 results in two possible 
descriptions —“the red one” and “the small one”— since both rule out the same distractors. 
 The rational speech act model. A more recent model in which discriminatory power 
plays a critical role is Frank and Goodman’s (2012) rational speech act model, which aims to 
account for both the production and comprehension of reference (see also Goodman & Frank, 
2016; Goodman & Stuhlmüller, 2013). It assumes that language users are rational actors: 
Speakers try to produce referring expressions that are optimally useful for listeners, and 
listeners, in turn, assume the speaker is maximally helpful. 
 During reference production, the probability that a speaker chooses an attribute is 
directly proportional to the informativeness of this property, formalised as a function of 
surprisal, which is an information-theoretic measure expressing (in this case) how much a 
given property reduces the listener’s uncertainty about which object is the target. For 
example, if one attribute rules out twice as many distractors as another attribute, then the 
most discriminatory attribute is chosen twice as often as the less discriminatory one. 
 Frank and Goodman (2012) showed that their model made very accurate predictions for 
an experiment in which participants were asked to bet which single property (e.g., “blue” or 
“circle”) would be most likely to be selected by a speaker referring to a target (e.g., a blue 
circle) that was presented together with a distractor set (e.g., a blue square and a green 
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square). However, as it stands, the model does not select multiple properties and therefore 
cannot account for psycholinguistic evidence from reference production tasks that speakers 
often use multiple properties in overspecified descriptions. In addition, the use of a single 
property is often not sufficient to distinguish the target from all distractors; yet, as we 
mentioned above, speakers rarely use underspecified descriptions. The model needs further 
development to account for these experimental findings. Nevertheless, an attractive feature of 
the model is that it is non-deterministic: It assumes that, if there is more than one 
distinguishing property (a property that holds true of the referent but is false of at least one of 
the distractors), each of these properties is selected some proportion of the time. This 
contrasts with many other computational algorithms that are deterministic, that is, they 
always generate the same referring expression in a particular situation (e.g., in an 
experimental condition). As we have argued in Van Deemter, Gatt, Van Gompel, and 
Krahmer (2012), reference production is normally non-deterministic; different speakers may 
produce different descriptions in a given context. In fact, speakers themselves are not 
deterministic either, but may produce different descriptions in the same context on different 
occasions as well (Viethen & Dale, 2010). 
 The incremental algorithm. Arguably the most influential computational model of 
reference generation has been the incremental algorithm proposed by Dale and Reiter (1995). 
It works from the assumption that some attributes are preferred over others (cf. Pechmann, 
1989). The algorithm presupposes the existence of a fixed preference order for a given 
domain, which is a complete ranking of all relevant attributes. Such a preference order can be 
used to model the relative importance of different attributes to the communicative task, their 
salience, or their (a)typicality for the objects in question. The algorithm iterates through this 
preference order, adding an attribute if it helps ruling out a distractor not previously ruled out 
and terminating when a set of attributes has been selected that collectively rules out all 
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distractors. Like the greedy heuristic algorithm, it can produce overspecified descriptions due 
to its incremental nature. 
 To see how the incremental algorithm works, let us consider the examples in Fig. 2, 
which will be tested as three different conditions in the current study. Fig. 2a is similar to Fig. 
1: Both colour and size are fully discriminatory in that each attribute alone distinguishes the 
circled target from its distractors. In Fig. 2b, size is fully discriminatory, whereas colour is 
only partially discriminating because it rules out only distractor. Finally, in Fig. 2c, colour is 
fully discriminatory whereas size is only partially discriminatory. 
_______________________________ 
Insert Fig. 2 about here 
_______________________________ 
 Let us say that the preference order for our examples is < type, colour, size >. As a 
result, the incremental algorithm first considers type in all examples; our target is a candle, 
but so are both distractors, hence the algorithm ignores this attribute and considers colour 
next. In Fig. 2a, the target is grey, while both distractors have different colours. Hence, the 
algorithm selects colour, and since this rules out all distractors, the search stops and the 
algorithm does not consider size. There is a final check whether the type attribute was 
selected, and if not, the algorithm includes it anyway, since (so the reasoning goes) an object 
description without type information (usually expressed by the head noun) is undesirable. 
The algorithm then terminates with a set of properties that could be realised linguistically as 
“the grey candle”. Thus, here, the algorithm generates a minimally specified description. 
 This is different in Fig. 2b. Following the same reasoning as before, type is not 
selected, but colour is (because it rules out the red candle). Since this does not rule out all 
distractors, the model now considers size, which is also selected (since it rules out the large 
grey candle). All distractors are ruled out, and the algorithm terminates with a set of 
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properties that could be realised as “the small grey candle”. This is an overspecified 
description, since “the small candle” would have been sufficient to rule out both distractors. 
In other words, the selection of size makes the previous inclusion of colour redundant, but 
due to the incremental nature of the model, colour is realised nonetheless. 
 Finally, in Fig. 2c, colour is also first selected and because it rules out all distractors, 
size is not considered. As a result, the algorithm ends up with properties that could be 
realised as “the grey candle”, which is a minimally specified expression. 
The incremental algorithm was strongly influenced by psycholinguistic work that had 
shown that speakers frequently overspecify and have a preference for certain attributes such 
as colour over of others, such as size. Subsequent experimental evaluations also reveal that 
the incremental algorithm produces descriptions that are more like those produced by human 
speakers than the full brevity and greedy heuristic algorithms, if an appropriate preference 
order is assumed (Van Deemter, Gatt, Van der Sluis, & Power, 2012). However, one issue 
with the incremental algorithm is that it is deterministic. Given a preference order and a 
domain, the incremental algorithm always predicts the same output in a specific condition. 
The candles in Figs. 2a and 2c are always referred to using the minimal description “the grey 
candle”, while the one in Fig. 2b is always referred to with the overspecified description “the 
large grey candle”. As we have discussed above, this prediction is not in accordance with the 
psycholinguistic data described above, which reveal that speakers produce descriptions that 
sometimes are and sometimes are not overspecified. 
 
Developing more psychologically plausible conceptualisation accounts 
The discussion above indicates that current computational models of reference generation are 
not yet completely psychologically realistic, as they cannot account for the full range of 
experimental evidence from human speakers. We therefore set out to improve these models, 
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taking the incremental algorithm as the starting point, and then to test their predictions in a 
series of reference production experiments. 
 Non-deterministic incremental algorithms. As we have seen, a major issue with the 
incremental algorithm is its deterministic nature, which is due to the complete, fixed ordering 
of attributes in the preference list. In Van Deemter et al. (2012), we proposed (but did not 
test) a variant of the incremental algorithm (which we call the “non-deterministic incremental 
algorithm”, or non-deterministic IA for brevity), which non-deterministically varies the order 
in which attributes are checked.  
 To see how this works, reconsider Figs. 2a-c. The algorithm checks colour before size 
with a probability c and it checks size before colour the rest of the time, with a probability 1–
c. Thus, c represents the colour-size preference. In Fig. 2a, in those cases where colour is 
checked first, the algorithm includes this in the description. Because it rules out all 
distractors, size is not subsequently checked. Assuming (as before) that type is always 
included, this results in a description such as “the grey candle” with a probability of c. The 
rest of the time (with a probability of 1–c), size is checked first. Because this also rules out all 
distractors, colour will not be added, resulting in “the small candle” with a probability of 1–c. 
The algorithm does not generate overspecified descriptions (“the small grey candle”) in Fig. 
2a, because once a fully distinguishing description has been found, it terminates. In Fig. 2b, 
speakers also first select colour with a probability of c, but because this does not result in a 
fully discriminatory expression, they add size, resulting in the overspecified “small grey 
candle” with a probability of c. The rest of the time, they first choose size, and because this is 
fully discriminatory, this results in “small candle” with a probability of 1–c. Finally, in Fig. 
2c, initial selection of colour results in a fully discriminatory expression, so it produces “grey 
candle” with a probability of c, but when they first choose size, they need to add colour, 
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resulting in “small grey candle” with a probability of 1–c. Thus, unlike the original IA, the 
non-deterministic IA generates overspecified descriptions in Fig. 2c some proportion of time. 
_______________________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
_______________________________ 
 Table 1 shows the formulas for generating the different non-deterministic IA 
descriptions. Assuming we can determine the colour-size preference c, the non-deterministic 
IA makes quantitative predictions about cases such as those in Fig. 2. For example, if the 
colour-size preference is .8, then “grey candle” in Figs. 2a and 2c and “small grey candle” in 
Fig. 3b should be produced in 80% of cases, while “small candle” in Figs. 2a and 2b and 
“small grey candle” in Fig. 2c should be generated in 20% of cases. Thus, if we can 
determine the colour-size preference c from the descriptions that speakers produce in one 
condition, we can predict the descriptions they should produce in another condition. 
 In sum, the non-deterministic IA appears to be a promising candidate for modelling 
conceptualisation during the human production of descriptions: It retains all positive aspects 
of the original incremental algorithm (incrementality, overspecification), and also captures 
the inherent non-determinism of human speakers. Until now, the quantitative predictions of 
the non-deterministic IA have not been tested, so we did this in the current study. 
 However, as noted above, the non-deterministic IA predicts no overspecification in Fig. 
2a, when both attributes are fully discriminatory. However, Goudbeek and Krahmer (2012) 
and Viethen, Van Vessem, Goudbeek and Krahmer (2017) showed that overspecification 
occurred between 11 and 40% of the time in such situations. These results suggest that the 
choice of an overspecified rather than a minimally specified description in Fig. 2a is also 
non-deterministic; speakers do not always produce minimal descriptions. We therefore also 
tested a modified version of the non-deterministic IA.  
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 In this modified algorithm, speakers sometimes add a second attribute even if the first 
attribute they selected is fully discriminatory. Fig. 3 shows the decision tree for the three 
conditions in Fig. 2 and Table 1 shows the formulas. The likelihood with which a particular 
description is chosen can be worked out by starting at “select first attribute” and following 
the arrows to the particular description. In the colour-or-size condition (Fig. 2a), speakers 
first choose colour or size depending on the preference (respectively c and 1–c). Either 
attribute is fully discriminating, but to account for previous evidence that speakers sometimes 
overspecify in this condition, the modified non-deterministic IA predicts that, in some 
proportion of trials, speakers add a second attribute. We assume that the probability that this 
happens is determined by the preference for this attribute: c for colour and 1–c for size. The 
probability of first selecting colour and then adding size in the colour-or-size condition is the 
product of these two selections: c*(1–c). But because speakers can also first select size and 
then add colour (1–c)*c, the total probability of colour-and-size descriptions is the sum of the 
two routes through the decision tree: c*(1–c)+(1–c)*c. In contrast, there is only one route to a 
colour-only description (c*c) and to a size-only (1-c)*(1-c) description. In a similar way, Fig. 
3 can be used to derive formulas for the colour-only and size-only conditions. Critically, the 
algorithm predicts that after selecting colour in the colour-only condition, speakers 
sometimes add size and after selecting size in the size-only condition, they sometimes add 
colour. 
_______________________________ 
Insert Fig. 3 about here 
_______________________________ 
 PRO: A model combining discriminatory power with preferences. So far, we have 
discussed two classes of potential conceptualisation models for human reference production: 
models relying either on preferences, such as the incremental algorithm, or on discriminatory 
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power, such as the greedy algorithm and the rational speech act theory. Recently, we have 
proposed a probabilistic conceptualisation model that does both (Gatt, Van Gompel, Van 
Deemter, & Krahmer, 2013; Van Gompel, Gatt, Krahmer, & Van Deemter, 2012). We 
termed this model the Probabilistic Referential Overspecification model (PRO), because the 
aims of this model are to account (1) for the fact that human reference production is 
probabilistic and (2) for the finding that humans frequently overspecify. In PRO, 
discriminatory power is assumed to play a role if an attribute rules out all distractors in one 
fell swoop. If there is a single fully discriminatory attribute, such as size in Fig. 2b or colour 
in Fig. 2c, then this attribute is always chosen first. However, when there are two fully 
discriminating attributes (as in Fig. 2a) preference comes into play: The model non-
deterministically selects one of the fully-discriminating attributes, with the chance that a 
particular attribute is chosen depending on its preference. For example, the chance that colour 
is selected can be c, whereas the chance that size is chosen is 1–c, as in the non-deterministic 
IA. If a single attribute is fully discriminating, the model could terminate after selecting 
either colour or size. But PRO assumes that the decision to stop or to overspecify is made 
non-deterministically as well. This is the second place where preference parameter c has an 
effect: The more preferred an attribute is, the more likely that it is added. In addition, we 
assume a second, “overspecification eagerness” parameter e that affects the likelihood that 
speakers overspecify. This parameter is motivated by evidence that the likelihood of 
overspecification is affected by the speaker’s task and by the type of speaker. For example, as 
we have seen, Arts (2004) and Arts et al. (2011) found that overspecification was more 
common in fault-critical situations, Rubio-Fernandez (2016) found that the frequency of 
overspecification depended on the instructions to the participants, and Deutsch and 
Pechmann (1982) found that adults overspecify more often than children. Note that because 
the overspecification eagerness parameter e is not a probability, but a parameter that 
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influences the probability with which speakers overspecify, it can be either positive or 
negative: Positive values make overspecification more likely than it would be if this 
parameter were not included, whereas negative values make it less likely. 
 PRO can be formalised as an algorithm, shown in Appendix 1. This algorithm allows us 
to make predictions for a wide range of situations with different targets and distractors. The 
present paper will focus on decision trees derived from the algorithm, which exemplify the 
workings of the PRO algorithm. Fig. 4 shows the decision tree for the conditions in Fig. 2. To 
work out the probabilities for referring expressions we start at “select first attribute”. Next, 
we follow the arrows to the appropriate condition and then the particular expression. For 
example, the probability that a speaker produces “small grey candle” in the colour-only fully 
distinguishing condition (Fig. 2c) is the product of the chance that she first selects the fully 
distinguishing attribute colour (1: the speaker always selects it) and the probability that size is 
added, with the latter probability being determined by the preference for size (1–c) plus the 
eagerness to overspecify (e). The probability that a speaker produces “grey candle” in the 
same condition is the product of first selecting colour (1) and subsequently not adding size, 
with the latter being the preference for not size (c) minus the overspecification preference e. 
Note that because the probabilities need to add up to one, the value for e is either added to or 
subtracted from the colour or size preference (rather than e.g., multiplied or divided by it). 
Also note that in the colour-or-size condition (Fig. 2a), colour-and-size descriptions can arise 
because speakers can first select colour and then add size c(1–c+e) or they can first select size 
and then colour (1–c)(c+e). As a result, the likelihood that a speaker chooses a colour and 
size description in this condition is c(1–c+e)+(1–c)(c+e). Table 1 shows a summary of the 
formulas. 
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_______________________________ 
Insert Fig. 4 about here 
_______________________________ 
 PRO relies on insights from other models, but crucially combines them in a novel way. 
In common with the greedy heuristic algorithm and the rational speech act theory, it assumes 
that discriminatory power plays a role in concept selection, although in contrast to these 
models, it only plays a role when an attribute rules out all distractors and unlike in the greedy 
heuristic, ties of such fully discriminatory attributes are resolved based on preferences. It 
builds on the incremental algorithm because it assumes that attributes’ preferences play an 
important role and that concept selection is incremental in nature. Like the non-deterministic 
IA and rational speech act theory, PRO assumes that concept selection is probabilistic, and 
finally, the assumption that attribute selection does not always stop once a fully 
discriminating description has been found is shared with the modified non-deterministic IA. 
 
Overview of the Experiments 
We report three experiments that contrasted the predictions of PRO and the different variants 
of the non-deterministic incremental algorithm. The conditions in the experiments were 
specifically designed so we could accurately determine the parameter values in the models 
and derive quantitative predictions from them.  
 Experiment 1 tested scenarios such as in Fig. 2, where colour and size discriminated the 
target from the distractors. To test how well the predictions of the models generalised to a 
different combination of attributes, Experiment 2 investigated scenarios where the target 
object’s type and colour were distinguishing features. We conducted the experiments in 
English and Dutch, to determine whether the models can account for the choice of referring 
expressions in both languages. Finally, in Experiment 3, three attributes discriminated the 
CONCEPTUALISATION IN REFERENCE PRODUCTION 18 
 
target from the distractors, making the production of reference potentially more complex 
because speakers have a larger choice of attributes and can produce longer expressions. 
 The models under consideration all deal with reference in its simplest form, in that they 
do not account for the production of, say, complex descriptions including negation (“not the 
broom”) or reference to sets (“two candles”), so we used simple scenes such as in Fig. 2, 
where complex descriptions would be unlikely. In order to minimise the role of attention, we 
also used a small number of distractors: In domains with larger distractor set sizes, speakers 
may not see or may not pay attention to all distractors, so they would not be able to take them 
into account during reference production. Note that it is relatively common to have a limited 
number of objects in visual attention, for example the objects on a table in front of you. 
 Speakers described the target pictures to an addressee, who had to select the picture that 
the speaker described. Both participants saw the same pictures, but in different positions so 
that the speaker could not use the picture location (“middle candle”). In this way, we could 
investigate how speakers produced reference for an addressee while controlling for other 
factors that affect interactive dialogue such as speaker adjustment due to feedback from the 
addressee, alignment with the addressee and the influence of the preceding discourse 
(priming from a previous description or anaphoric reference). In future research, it will be 
helpful to test more complex situations with a more interactive task, but we believe it is 
important to examine simple situations first, because the models should make particularly 
precise predictions in such cases. 
 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Thirty pairs of undergraduate students, all native speakers from the 
University of Dundee, took part in the English experiment. In the Dutch experiment, we also 
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tested 30 participant pairs; all participants were native speakers of Dutch from Tilburg 
University. All speakers reported normal colour vision. 
Materials. The materials in both the English and Dutch experiment consisted of 36 
experimental item sets, each consisting of three conditions. Fig. 2 gives an example. In each 
condition, three pictures of objects (e.g., three candles) that only differed from each other in 
size or colour (or both size and colour) were shown. We used blue, grey, red and green as 
colours and the size of the smaller objects was two thirds of the larger objects. The target 
object was circled; its position was counterbalanced across items. The pictures were 
constructed using a version of the Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980) line drawings with 
colour and texture (Rossion & Pourtois, 2004).  
 In the colour-or-size condition, mention of either the target’s size or colour was 
sufficient for the addressee to identify the target, because the target differed from both 
distractors in both size and colour. In the size-only condition, the use of size was sufficient to 
identify the target. Colour distinguished the target from only one of the distractors. Finally, in 
the colour-only condition, the use of colour ruled out all distractors, whereas the size of the 
target distinguished it from only one of the distractors.  
 The experiment included 108 filler items. It was run together with Experiment 2, so 
thirty-six of the fillers consisted of the experimental items from Experiment 2. In the other 72 
fillers, the target differed from both distractors in only its type (36 fillers), its orientation (44), 
part of its colour (6) or the number of objects (22). 
Design. The 36 experimental items were tested in three conditions. For each language, 
we constructed three experimental lists consisting of 12 items in each condition. The 
conditions were rotated over the lists according to a Latin square design so that all items were 
presented in all conditions, but each list contained only one condition of an item. Ten 
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participants were randomly assigned to each list. The experimental items and 108 fillers were 
presented in a random order that was the same across lists. 
Procedure. Participants were tested in pairs. The experimenter randomly assigned the 
roles of speaker and addressee to the two participants. Participants were sat behind computer 
monitors, facing each other. The participants were informed that they would see a series of 
scenarios containing objects. They were told that they would see the same objects, but that 
these appeared in different locations. This was done so that speakers would avoid producing 
referring expressions containing spatial information. The speaker was instructed to describe 
the circled objects so that the addressee could identify them and the addressee was asked to 
use the computer mouse to tick the described object on their screen. 
Coding. Following transcription of the recordings, we scored whether speakers used 
colour-and-size descriptions (e.g., “the large blue helicopter”), colour-only descriptions (e.g., 
“the red kite”), and size-only descriptions (e.g., “small racket”). All trials on which speakers 
made a speech error and then repaired their utterance were excluded. There were 51 repairs 
(4.7%) in the English experiment and 94 (9.8%) in the Dutch experiment. We also excluded 8 
cases (0.7%) from the English experiment and 7 (0.7%) from the Dutch experiment where 
speakers produced a modifier after the noun (usually in a relative clause, e.g., “big light bulb 
that’s green”), because they may be similar to a repair. Finally, 4 trials (0.4%) were removed 
from the Dutch experiment because the speaker mentioned neither colour nor size. 
 
Results and Discussion 
Fig. 5 shows the proportions of colour-and-size, colour-only and size-only descriptions in the 
English and Dutch experiments along with the predictions of the various models (see below). 
Because we were mainly interested in testing how well the models predicted the data rather 
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than in analysing differences between conditions, we focus on comparisons between the 
observed data and the predictions of the models below. 
As is clear from Fig. 5, the pattern of data was very similar in English and Dutch. 
Speakers overspecified in all conditions. Overspecification occurred most frequently in the 
size-only condition, but also occurred, to a lesser extent, in the colour-or-size and size-only 
conditions. In contrast, speakers very rarely underspecified: We found only 4 such cases. The 
experiment also showed a clear preference for colour over size: In the colour-or-size 
condition, speakers used colour-only descriptions considerably more often than size-only 
descriptions and colour-only descriptions were more frequent in the colour-only condition 
than size-only descriptions in the size-only condition. The critical question is: Can the models 
we discussed in the Introduction account for the numerical patterns we observed? 
 
Model Testing 
Parameter setting in the non-deterministic algorithm and PRO. The goodness-of-fit of 
the non-deterministic IA and PRO is dependent on their parameter settings. To get an 
impression of the fit of these models, and to compare them with each other, we used the 
generalisation criterion methodology (Busemeyer & Wang, 2000). This method is 
particularly suitable to studies with experimentally controlled conditions, as it splits the data 
into two subdesigns based on the experimental conditions in the experiment. It uses one 
subdesign consisting of one or more conditions to determine the best-fitting parameter values 
for this subdesign (the calibration stage) and then uses these values to make predictions for a 
different extrapolation condition (the generalisation stage). As pointed out by Busemeyer 
and Wang (2000), this cross-validation method compares a priori predictions of models, 
because it tests to what extent the parameter settings in the training condition(s) make 
accurate predictions for a new set of condition(s). 
CONCEPTUALISATION IN REFERENCE PRODUCTION 22 
 
 In our experiments, we used two conditions as calibration conditions to determine the 
best-fitting parameter values and then used the remaining condition as the extrapolation 
condition. Thus, we found the best-fitting parameter values for the size-only and colour-only 
conditions to make numerical predictions in the colour-or-size condition. Similarly, the 
colour-or-size and colour-only conditions were used to make predictions in the size-only 
condition and the colour-or-size and size-only conditions for predictions in the colour-only 
condition. In this way, we obtained a priori predictions for all conditions. Because at least in 
theory, the findings from English and Dutch could be different, we did this separately for 
each language. 
 We used the binomial and multinomial probability functions binopdf and mnpdf in 
MatLab version 8.0.0.783 to calculate the parameter values that resulted in the highest 
p(data|model) in each of the pairs of calibration conditions. The obtained maximum 
likelihood parameter values from the pairs of calibration conditions were then used in the 
formulas for each of the models to calculate predictions in each of the conditions. 
 Using the binomial and multinomial probability functions, we then calculated 
p(data|model) across all conditions. We also calculated a value for the Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC), which provides an index of the goodness of fit of a model (the lower, the 
better the fit) and takes into account the number of free parameters (Schwarz, 1978). Finally, 
to compare two models directly, we calculated the Bayes factor (B): 𝐵 =
𝑒−
1
2
(𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙1−𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙2). A Bayes factor larger than 10 is generally considered strong 
evidence for the better fitting model (Lewandowky & Farrell, 2010; Wasserman, 2000). 
Evaluation of the non-deterministic IA. As explained in the introduction, the 
original, deterministic IA can be made non-deterministic by assuming that the colour-over-
size preference is probabilistic. Table 1 shows a summary of the formulas used to calculate 
the predictions. We determined the maximum likelihood value for c in each pair of conditions 
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in each language by finding the value for c that resulted in the best fit, the highest 
p(data|model), for each pair of conditions. These values were then used to make predictions 
in the remaining, third condition. 
Table 2 shows all values of c that we used to derive predictions from the non-
deterministic IA in each language. In all cases, c is larger than .5, indicating that the non-
deterministic IA assumes a preference for colour over size. 
_______________________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
_______________________________ 
Fig. 5 shows the predicted probabilities in English and Dutch and Table 3 shows the 
goodness-of-fit and BIC of the non-deterministic IA together with those of the other models 
discussed below. The modelling results show that the non-deterministic IA, which has one 
free parameter (c), provides a reasonable fit to the data in both English and Dutch. However, 
it predicts no overspecifications in the colour-or-size condition, whereas the data showed that 
overspecifications occurred fairly often (17% in English, 23% in Dutch). 
_______________________________ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
_______________________________ 
Evaluation of the modified non-deterministic IA. To account for the observed 
overspecifications in the colour-or-size condition, we assume that the incremental algorithm 
does not always stop after it has found a fully-discriminating expression, but sometimes adds 
a further attribute. See Fig. 3 for the decision tree and Table 1 for the formulas. 
We again determined the maximum likelihood value for c in each pair of conditions, 
and then used this value for predictions in the remaining condition. Table 2 shows the c-
values that we used and Fig. 5 shows the predicted proportions. We see that the algorithm 
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now correctly predicts overspecifications in the colour-or-size condition and Table 3 shows 
that overall, the fit of the model is fairly good. The fit is better than that of the original non-
deterministic incremental algorithm: B = 3.04*1075 in English and B = 8.57*10103 in Dutch. 
However, the modified version predicts more frequent overspecifications in the colour-or-
size condition than we observed and the predictions in the size-only and colour-only 
conditions are less good than in the original non-deterministic IA. 
The modified algorithm may not be completely successful in accounting for our data 
because the probability of adding a further attribute to an already fully-distinguishing 
expression may not just be determined by the preference for that attribute. As mentioned in 
the Introduction, there is evidence that the likelihood of overspecification is affected by both 
task and type of speaker (Arts et al, 2011, Rubio-Fernandez, 2016; Deutsch & Pechmann, 
1982). We therefore added an overspecification eagerness parameter e  and tested whether 
including it would improve the predictions of the modified incremental model. In this model, 
the probability of adding size after selecting fully discriminatory colour is the preference for 
size (1–c) plus the overspecification eagerness (e) and the probability of not adding size in 
this case is the remaining probability (c–e). Similarly, the probability of adding colour after 
choosing fully discriminatory size is the preference for colour (c) plus the overspecification 
eagerness value (e), while the probability of not adding colour is the remainder (1–c–e). 
For brevity, we do not present the full model testing here, because including the 
overspecification parameter did not help. The maximum likelihood value of e for predicting 
expressions in the colour-or-size condition was very negative (–.46 in English, –.57 in 
Dutch). A negative e-value is theoretically possible and means that overspecification is 
predicted to be less likely than it would have been without this parameter (see modelling of 
PRO below), but in this case it resulted in a negative value for the proportion of colour-and-
size descriptions in the colour-or-size condition in both English and Dutch. Thus, including 
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an overspecification parameter resulted in impossible values, indicating that it is 
inappropriate to include it in this model. 
Evaluation of the PRO model. The modelling above shows that neither the original 
non-deterministic IA nor the modified version provides a very good fit of all data. We 
therefore tested PRO, which assumes that speakers first choose an attribute that rules out all 
distractors; if there is more than one, then the probability of choosing an attribute is being 
determined by its preference c. Next, speakers may add a second attribute, with the chance of 
adding it depending on the preference for this attribute (c) and the overspecification 
eagerness of the speaker (e). See Fig. 5 for the decision tree and Table 1 for the formulas. 
We determined the maximum likelihood values and calculated the predicted 
proportions of expressions in the same way as before. Table 2 shows the parameter values 
and Fig. 5 shows the predictions. Note that the overspecification eagerness parameter e is 
negative, as it was in the version of incremental algorithm that included this parameter, but in 
this case, it did not result in negative predicted proportions. Inclusion of this parameter 
merely makes overspecification less likely than if it had not been included. (We also tested 
PRO without this parameter and although the fit was better than any of the versions of the 
incremental algorithm, it was less good than PRO with this parameter.) The model testing 
results in Table 3 show that the fit of PRO is excellent. It is considerably better than that of 
the next-best model, the modified non-deterministic IA: English B = 6.55*1089, Dutch B = 
2.11*10125. PRO predicts all observed proportions within .07.  
 
Discussion 
Comparison of the models and the observed data showed that PRO provided the best fit to the 
data from both the English and Dutch experiments. The non-deterministic incremental 
algorithm failed to account for overspecifications in the colour-or-size condition, because the 
algorithm terminates when either colour or size is selected, as either attribute is fully 
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distinguishing. The modified version of the incremental algorithm was designed to deal with 
this issue, because it sometimes adds a further attribute even if a fully distinguishing attribute 
has already been selected. This algorithm did indeed generate overspecifications in the 
colour-or-size condition, but provided a less good fit in the size-only and colour-only 
conditions than the original non-deterministic algorithm. Additional modelling showed that 
the fit did not improve when an overspecification eagerness parameter was added, suggesting 
that the better fit of PRO is not merely due to the extra parameter it has. 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 investigated whether models of reference generation can successfully account 
for the use of two frequently used attributes, colour and size. Experiment 2 investigated the 
use of a different commonly used attribute, the object’s type or category, which is usually 
encoded by the head noun, such as “bed” or “ashtray”. In this respect, it is different from 
other attributes, which are generally encoded by a modifier. Thus, its selection may involve 
different mechanisms from those of other attributes. Specifically, the original incremental 
algorithm as proposed by Dale and Reiter (1995) assumes that type is included in the 
description regardless of whether it rules out any distractors, that is, speakers would say “the 
grey bed” rather than “the grey one” even if all objects in the context are beds. In our 
modelling of the non-deterministic IA, we made the same assumption. 
 In contrast, the PRO model does not make any additional assumptions to account for 
the use of the type attribute: The decision tree in Fig. 4 also applies to cases where type is a 
distinguishing attribute. Similarly, we do not need to make any special assumptions for the 
use of type in the modified non-deterministic IA, because it assumes that, after selecting a 
fully distinguishing attribute, speakers sometimes add a further attribute. Hence, after 
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selecting an attribute such as colour, they may add type even though colour is fully 
distinguishing. 
 Thus, Experiment 2 tested whether models need to incorporate a special mechanism for 
dealing with type. Fig. 6 shows an example of the conditions in Experiment 3. The conditions 
were the same as in Experiment 1, but rather than manipulating colour and size, we 
manipulated type and colour. To test the various models, we examined whether speakers 
mentioned the type alone, the colour alone or both the type and colour in the different 
conditions. As before, we tested both English and Dutch. 
_______________________________ 
Insert Fig. 6 about here 
_______________________________ 
Method 
 Participants. Experiment 2 was run together with Experiment 1, so the participants 
were the same. 
 Materials, design, and procedure. These were the same as in Experiment 1, except 
that the experimental materials now had conditions where either only colour ruled out all 
distractors, only type ruled out all distractors or both type and colour ruled out all distractors. 
 Coding. The coding was done in the same way as in Experiment 1. In the English 
experiment, 25 trials (2.3%) were excluded because speakers repaired their utterance, 2 
(0.2%) because they used a postnominal modifier and 4 (0.4%) because they used a negation 
(e.g., “not the scissors”). In the Dutch experiment, 38 trials (3.5%) were repairs, 3 (0.3%) 
contained a postnominal modifier, 5 (0.5%) were excluded because the response could not be 
understood, and 18 (1.7%) because of recording failure. 
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Results and Discussion 
Fig. 7 shows the observed proportions of type-and-colour, type-only and colour-only 
descriptions in English and Dutch along with the predictions of the models. As in Experiment 
1, the results from English and Dutch were similar: Speakers overspecified in all conditions 
and they rarely underspecified (only 4 cases). The experiment showed a clear preference for 
type over colour: In the type-or-colour condition, speakers produced type-only descriptions 
much more frequently than colour-only descriptions. In addition, they produced type-only 
descriptions in the type-only condition more often than colour-only descriptions in the 
colour-only condition. 
 
Model Testing 
Evaluation of the non-deterministic IA. Similar to Experiment 1, we turned the 
deterministic IA into a non-deterministic variant by assuming that the type-colour preference 
is probabilistic, that is, speakers first check colour with a probability of c and first check type 
with a probability of 1–c. Type is fully discriminatory in the type-or-colour condition, so 
when speakers first check type, they should not add colour, resulting in the expression bed 
with a proportion of 1–c. Colour is also fully discriminatory in this condition, so when 
speakers check colour first, they do not need to add type to rule out all distractors. However, 
to account for our finding that speakers rarely produced colour-only descriptions, we follow 
Dale and Reiter (1995) in assuming that the head noun is always produced, that is, type is 
always added. Thus, speakers should produce black bed with a proportion of c in the type-or-
colour condition. In the colour-only condition, speakers should again first choose type with a 
probability of 1–c, but because it is not fully discriminatory in this case, they should 
subsequently add colour. The rest of the time (c), they should first choose colour. However, 
although colour is fully discriminatory, they should again add type because it is encoded on 
the head noun. Thus, regardless of whether speakers first choose type or colour in the colour-
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only condition, they always end up including both attributes. Finally, in the type-only 
condition, type is fully discriminatory, so when they check this attribute first, they do not 
need to add colour, resulting in bed with a proportion of 1–c. The rest of the time, they first 
check colour, but because this is not fully discriminatory, they need to add type, resulting in 
black bed with a proportion of c. Table 4 shows the formulas for the non-deterministic IA. 
_______________________________ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
_______________________________ 
 As before, we determined the value for c in a particular condition and language by 
calculating the maximum likelihood value for c in the two other conditions of that language. 
See Table 5 for the values of c and Fig. 7 for the predictions. 
_______________________________ 
Insert Table 5 about here 
_______________________________ 
 Table 6 shows that the model makes fairly accurate predictions. In particular, it is 
notable that the non-deterministic IA correctly predicts overspecification in the type-or-
colour condition. The reason is that in cases where colour is selected first, the head noun, 
encoding type, is always added, resulting in an overspecified expression. Other predictions 
for Experiment 1 are also in line with the observed data. In particular, the non-deterministic 
IA predicts that colour-only descriptions are never produced (because it assumes that type is 
always included), and the observed data show that such descriptions are indeed very rare. It 
also correctly predicts that the majority of descriptions in the colour-only condition are type-
and-colour descriptions and that in the type-or-colour and type-only conditions, both type-
and-colour and type-only descriptions are produced a fair amount of time. However, the 
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model predicts more type-only descriptions in the type-or-colour than type-only condition, 
whereas the data show the opposite pattern. 
_______________________________ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
_______________________________ 
 Evaluation of the modified non-deterministic IA. The modified version of the IA is 
the same as in Experiment 1 (Fig. 3), except that size is replaced by type. Table 4 shows the 
formulas. As mentioned above, it does not require additional assumptions about the inclusion 
of the head noun. This is because the model assumes that a second attribute may be added 
even if the initially selected attribute is fully distinguishing. Assuming that type is strongly 
preferred, speakers should usually add it after selecting colour even if colour is fully 
distinguishing. Therefore, few colour-only descriptions should be produced. 
 We determined the type-colour preference value c as before, shown in Table 5 and 
resulting in the predictions in Fig. 7. The predictions are quite similar to those of the original 
non-deterministic algorithm, except that the modified model correctly predicts some colour-
only descriptions in the colour-only and type-and-colour conditions. Table 6 shows that the 
fit of the model is good, considerably better than the original non-deterministic IA: B = 
2.80*1047 for English and B = 4.43*1044 for Dutch. However, like the original model, it 
incorrectly predicts more type-only descriptions in the type-or-colour than type-only 
condition. We also tested whether adding an overspecification eagerness parameter similar to 
that used in PRO improved the model. Unlike in Experiment 1, this did not result in negative 
predicted proportions, but the model with the additional parameter provided a less good fit. 
Evaluation of the PRO model. To account for the data in Experiment 2, PRO makes 
the same assumptions and uses the same formulas as for the choice between colour and size 
in Experiment 1. The decision tree in Fig. 4 can be used by replacing size with type. Table 4 
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shows the formulas. Similar to the modified non-deterministic IA, PRO does not make any 
additional assumptions for the inclusion of the head noun. Thus, it predicts that type is 
omitted in a proportion of cases in the type-or-colour and colour-only conditions.  
We determined parameter values as before, shown in Table 5. In contrast to 
Experiment 1, the overspecification eagerness values e are positive, indicating that the model 
assumes that speakers are more eager to overspecify when the distinguishing attributes are 
type and colour than when they are colour and size. This may seem surprising given that 
Experiments 1 and 2 were run together with the same participants. One possible explanation 
is that speakers do not always consider type-and-colour descriptions as true 
overspecifications when only type or only colour is sufficient, because omitting the head 
noun is uncommon in English and Dutch (as our experiments show). Therefore, they may be 
more likely to overspecify in such cases. This suggests that the overspecification parameter e 
does not just capture how eagerly speakers overspecify, but also whether they consider type-
and-colour descriptions to be true overspecifications in cases where mentioning one of the 
attributes is sufficient. This is in line with Dale and Reiter’s (1995) proposal, which uses a 
special mechanism to ensure that a type is included in every description; however, our model 
arrives at this prediction automatically, without requiring any special mechanism. 
Fig. 7 shows the predictions of PRO. All predicted data points are within .07 of the 
observed data, resulting in a very good fit of the model, as shown in Table 6. The fit is better 
than the modified non-deterministic IA in English (B = 1.86*1013) and somewhat better in 
Dutch (B = 10.96).  
 
Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, PRO provided an excellent fit to the data from both the English and 
Dutch experiments. Although the two versions of the non-deterministic IA that we tested 
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provided a decent fit to the data, they performed less well. The original modified incremental 
IA did not predict any colour-only descriptions in the colour-only and type-and-colour 
conditions. The modified version did, but it incorrectly predicted that type-only descriptions 
should be more frequent in the type-or-colour than in the type-only condition. 
 An interesting conclusion from the modelling of the experimental results is that we do 
not need to assign a special status to the type attribute, that is, we do not need to assume that 
speakers add it because they want to avoid a referring expression without a head noun, unlike 
the incremental algorithm. Where the type is distinguishing, both PRO and the modified non-
deterministic IA can account for the paucity of descriptions without this attribute by 
assuming that it is strongly preferred. 
 
Experiment 3 
 
The previous experiments showed that PRO accounts well for the production of referring 
expressions when colour and size discriminated the target from the distractors (Experiment 1) 
and when type and colour did (Experiment 2). However, accounting for reference production 
in these experiments was arguably relatively simple. To test the scope of PRO and to 
compare it more thoroughly with the next-best model, the modified non-deterministic IA, we 
included a third discriminating attribute in Experiment 3. This makes the reference generation 
process in the models more complex because (1) speakers need to choose between three 
rather than two different attributes that each have their own preference, (2) they can produce 
longer expressions by choosing all three attributes and (3) because the attributes can be 
combined in more different ways, they have a larger number of expressions to choose from.  
 We used a border (e.g., a square or a triangle) around the objects as the third attribute 
because speakers normally realise the border attribute post-nominally in a prepositional 
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phrase (e.g., the airplane in the square). This allowed us to explore the possibility that 
concepts expressed as postnominal modifiers are selected differently from prenominal 
modifiers. Brown-Schmidt and Tanenhaus (2006), for example, showed that fixations to a 
size-contrast distractor were later when a size adjective was produced post-nominally (e.g., 
the triangle with small diamonds) than when it was produced pre-nominally (e.g., the small 
triangle), suggesting that pre- and postnominal modifiers are encoded at different points in 
time (see also Brown-Schmidt and Konopka, 2008). However, other research suggests that at 
least in some instances, speakers encode postnominal modifiers simultaneously with the 
earlier part of the noun phrase For example, Garrett’s (1975) analysis of speech errors 
showed that word exchange errors occur between different phrases in a clause (e.g., I broke a 
dinghy in the stay, where I broke a stay in the dinghy is intended), suggesting that lexical 
planning has a clausal scope (see also Meyer, 1996 for evidence from the picture-word 
interference method). 
 Experiment 3 did not aim to investigate the scope of conceptual planning directly, but 
because there is some evidence that pre- and postnominal modifiers are planned differently, 
we wanted to see whether PRO could account for the selection of concepts in postnominal 
modifiers. If the selection of concepts in postnominal modifiers is similar to that in 
prenominal modifiers, PRO would not need to make any additional assumptions to account 
for the use of the border attribute. But if concept selection is different in postnominal 
modifiers, then the PRO algorithm that we tested in Experiments 1 and 2 would not make 
accurate predictions for this case and additional mechanisms would need to be considered. To 
test the predictions of PRO and the modified non-deterministic IA, we used the conditions in 
Fig. 8, in which we manipulated the colour, size and border of the objects. 
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_______________________________ 
Insert Fig. 8 about here 
_______________________________ 
Method 
 Participants. Thirty-five new participants from the same population as in the English 
Experiments 1 and 2 took part. 
 Materials. The materials consisted of 84 experimental items in 7 conditions. Fig. 8 
shows an example. Each condition showed three objects of the same type. The objects were 
selected from Rossion and Pourtois (2004). The target object was indicated by a red arrow 
underneath it and its position was counterbalanced across items. In the seven conditions, we 
manipulated whether the colour, size or border of the target was different from that of the 
distractors. The border attribute was manipulated by putting either a square, circle, diamond 
or triangle around the objects. As in the previous experiments, we used four colours: blue, 
grey, red and green, but the size of the smaller objects was only half the size of the larger 
objects (it was two-thirds in Experiments 1 and 2). 
 In the colour-only condition, colour distinguished the target from both distractors, 
whereas size and border distinguished the target from only one of the distractors. Similarly, 
in the size-only and border-only conditions, respectively size and border distinguished the 
target from both distractors, whereas the other two attributes only distinguished it from one 
distractor. In the colour-and-size, colour-and-border and size-and-border conditions, there 
were always two fully discriminating attributes as indicated by the labels for the conditions, 
whereas the remaining attribute ruled out only one distractor. Finally, in the colour-size-or-
border condition, all three attributes each ruled out all distractors. 
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 We also included 96 fillers. In these fillers, the target differed from both distractors in 
both its colour and type (12 fillers), both its colour and border (12), its orientation (20), the 
number of objects (20), type only (14), size only (6), border only (6) or part of its colour (6). 
Design. All 84 experimental items had seven conditions. We constructed seven 
experimental lists consisting of 12 items per condition, using a Latin square design as before. 
Five participants were assigned to each list. The experimental items and fillers were 
presented in a random order that was the same across lists. 
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in the previous experiments except as 
follows. Instead of an addressee who was a real participant in the experiment, we used a 
confederate. The confederate was a male native English speaking student from the University 
of Dundee. None of the participants showed awareness that their partner was a confederate. 
To ensure that attributes were used as pre-modifiers or post-modifiers (rather than say, e.g., 
“blue in the circle”), the speaker was asked to name the object in each expression. 
 Coding. The coding was the same as in the previous experiments except that we now 
also coded whether speakers used the border attribute. We excluded trials on which 
participants produced a speech error (N = 208, 7.1%) or a postnominal modifier that did not 
include border (N = 42, 1.4%). We excluded 8 trials (0.3%) on which speakers did not 
include a head noun (e.g., “green”) because we wanted to test whether the models could 
account for the use of attributes that were expressed both before and after the noun. Finally, 3 
trials (0.1%) were excluded because speakers did not use either colour, size or border. 
 
Results and Discussion 
_______________________________ 
Insert Fig. 9 about here 
_______________________________ 
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Fig. 9 shows the observed proportions of referring expressions in each condition along with 
the predictions of the modified non-deterministic IA and PRO. As in Experiments 1 and 2, 
the results showed that overspecification was common in the conditions where the most 
preferred attribute (here: colour) did not rule out all distractors. Even in the conditions where 
colour was fully discriminating, participants used overspecified descriptions in over 35% of 
trials. Across conditions, participants used all combinations of attributes that led to 
unambiguous descriptions, including descriptions that contained all three attributes colour, 
size and border. Finally, participants again rarely produced underspecified expressions. 
 
Model testing 
 Evaluation of the modified non-deterministic IA. Because participants in Experiment 
3 could choose between three attributes (colour, size and border), the modified non-
deterministic IA had two parameters: one for the colour preference (c) and one for the size 
preference (s). The border preference was the remaining proportion (1–c–s). We only 
calculated the predictions of the model without the overspecification eagerness parameter 
because in both Experiments 1 and 2, the fit was better without it. 
 The algorithm cannot be presented in a single decision tree for all conditions, so instead 
we exemplify its workings with a decision tree for the colour-only condition (Fig. 10). The 
algorithm assumes that speakers may either select colour (c), size (s) or border (1–c–s) first in 
this condition. If they select colour, they may not add a further attribute because colour is 
fully discriminatory. The probability that no attribute is added is the colour preference (c). 
However, the modified version of the IA does not always terminate when a fully 
discriminating description is found, so either size or border may be added. The probability of 
adding either size or border is determined by the preference for each (respectively s and 1–c–
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s). After the second attribute is added, speakers may add a third attribute and the probability 
of this is again determined by the preference for that attribute. 
_______________________________ 
Insert Fig. 10 about here 
_______________________________ 
 The algorithm proceeds slightly differently if size is first selected in the colour-only 
condition, because this attribute is not fully distinguishing. Thus, speakers must add a further 
attribute. The probability that they add colour is the preference for colour normalised over the 
preferences of the remaining attributes colour and border (c/(1–s)), and similarly, the 
probability of adding border is the normalised preference for border. If speakers first select 
size and then colour, they may either add border (determined by its preference) or not, but if 
they first select size and then border, they must add colour, because neither size nor border is 
fully distinguishing. Finally, if speakers first select border, then the algorithm proceeds along 
similar lines as when they first select size.  
 As before, the likelihood that a particular expression is produced is calculated by 
multiplying the formulas at each stage in the decision tree and summing the different routes 
that can be taken. Appendix 2 shows all formulas derived from the algorithm. 
 We determined the parameter values of c and s in each condition by finding their 
maximum likelihood values in the other six conditions. Table 7 shows the values we used in 
each condition and Fig. 9 shows the resulting predictions. The fit of the model is quite poor: 
p(data|model) < 1.00*10–320, BIC > 1490. Especially, in the colour-only, size-only and 
border-only conditions, it overpredicts the probability that speakers use all three attributes 
and underpredicts the probability that they use a single attribute. In the colour-or-size, colour-
or-border and colour-size-or-border conditions, it underpredicts the proportion of colour-only 
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descriptions and in the size-or-border condition, it overpredicts colour-and-border 
descriptions. 
_______________________________ 
Insert Table 7 about here 
_______________________________ 
 Evaluation of PRO. Like the modified non-deterministic IA, PRO has parameters for 
the colour (c) and the size (s) preference; the border preference is the remainder (1–c–s). In 
addition, it includes the overspecification parameter (e), but in contrast to the previous 
experiments, we did not calculate its value using the other conditions in the current 
experiment. Given that our participants came from the same population and the method was 
similar to that in the previous experiments, the overspecification eagerness value in the 
current experiment should be similar. In particular, it should be similar to the value in 
Experiment 1, because neither in the current experiment nor in Experiment 1 was the head 
noun a distinguishing attribute. Experiment 2 showed that the overspecification value is 
different when the head noun is a distinguishing attribute. (We argued this is because 
speakers do not consider overspecification by the head noun as true overspecification, 
because omitting the head noun is uncommon.) Thus, we used the overspecification value 
from Experiment 1 (–.0531). 
 Fig. 11 shows the PRO decision tree for all conditions. We exemplify it using the 
colour-or-size condition. Both colour and size are fully distinguishing attributes, so speakers 
should always first choose either colour or size. The probability of choosing each is 
determined by the preference for the attribute normalised over the two fully distinguishing 
attributes. The starting box on the left in Fig. 11 shows this. For example, the probability of 
first selecting colour in the colour-or-size (CS) condition is c/(c+s). Next, speakers may add 
no further attribute, add size or add border. The probability that speakers do not add a further 
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attribute is the colour preference (i.e. not the size plus border preference) minus the 
overspecification eagerness value (c–e). The probability that speakers do add another 
attribute is the remainder (1–c+e) multiplied by the preference for the attribute (e.g., size) 
normalised over the two remaining attributes (e.g., size and border, s/(1–c). Finally, speakers 
may add a third attribute, with the chance being determined by the preference for that 
attribute plus the overspecification eagerness value (e.g., 1–c–s+e for adding border after 
colour and size). Again, the probability that a particular description is used is calculated by 
multiplying the formulas at each stage and summing the different routes that lead to the 
expression. Appendix 2 shows all formulas. 
_______________________________ 
Insert Fig. 11 about here 
_______________________________ 
 We determined the c and s parameter values as before. Table 7 shows these values and 
Fig. 9 shows the predictions of PRO. In all conditions, PRO correctly predicts what the most 
frequently used description is and in all conditions except the size-or-border condition, it also 
predicts what the second most frequent description is. All proportions are predicted within 
.15. The model appears to have no particular difficulty with descriptions that used the 
postnominal border modifier and accurately predicts the proportions of descriptions with all 
three attributes. Overall, the fit of the model is good: p(data|model) = 8.91*10–108, BIC = 
508.77. Note that the BIC value cannot directly be compared to that in Experiments 1 and 2, 
because it is based on more conditions. The fit of PRO is considerably better than that of the 
modified non-deterministic IA: B > 6.11*10234. 
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Discussion 
The main aim of the experiment was to test whether PRO could account for reference 
production in more complex scenarios with more distinguishing attributes, resulting in a 
wider choice of attributes and in potentially longer expressions. The modelling results 
suggested that it can: The predicted proportions were generally very close to the observed 
results for all descriptions. 
 Most critically, PRO made better predictions than the modified non-deterministic IA, 
the model closest to PRO in Experiments 1 and 2. Although the modified non-deterministic 
IA made fairly accurate predictions in the previous experiments, it did not fare well in 
Experiment 3. In particular, in all conditions except the size-or-border condition, it predicted 
too many descriptions with all three attributes and in all conditions, it predicted too few with 
a single attribute. Unlike PRO, the modified non-deterministic IA does not appear to 
generalise to the more complex scenarios in Experiment 3, suggesting that its reference 
production mechanisms are different from those of human speakers. 
 Experiment 3 showed that the production mechanisms underlying PRO do generalise to 
situations that are more complex than in the previous experiments. In addition, PRO made 
accurate predictions for postnominal modifiers that include the border attribute; it did not 
require additional assumptions to deal with these modifiers. PRO assumes that properties are 
not necessarily selected in the order in which they are realized, that is, whether they occur 
pre- or postnominally. Instead, an attribute’s discriminatory power and preference affect the 
order in which concepts are selected. PRO is currently a concept selection model only; it does 
not account for the linearization of the selected attributes, but assumes that this is a separate 
task. The modelling results from Experiment 3 showed that this is a feasible account, as PRO 
made accurate predictions about both pre- and postnominal attributes. Although Experiment 
3 did not directly test whether human speakers select postnominal concepts after prenominal 
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concepts, the fact that PRO can account for both without postulating additional mechanisms 
suggests that human speakers do not distinguish between pre- and postnominal modifiers 
during concept selection. 
 To derive the PRO predictions, we used the same overspecification eagerness value e as 
in Experiment 1, so the number of free parameters of PRO in Experiment 3 was the same as 
that of the modified non-deterministic IA. Thus, the number of free parameters does not 
explain the better fit of PRO compared to the modified non-deterministic IA. The finding that 
the overspecification eagerness value from Experiment 1 resulted in accurate predictions for 
Experiment 3 is striking for two reasons. First, if postnominal modifiers were added as an 
“afterthought” when the prenominal modifiers did not rule out all distractors (similar to a 
speech repair), then the overspecification value for postnominal attributes should have been 
different from that of prenominal attributes, because speakers would have been less eager to 
add an overspecifying postnominal attribute. The fact that we could use the same 
overspecification value for pre- and postnominal attributes again suggests that their concepts 
are selected in the same way. Second, one might have expected that the more attributes 
speakers have already selected, the less likely it is that they select further attributes. As a 
result, the overspecification value should have been lower during the selection of the third 
attribute than the second. This did not appear to be the case: Using the same value, PRO 
accounted for referring expressions that included two as well as three attributes. In other 
words, a third attribute is as likely to be added as a second. However, expressions with three 
attributes are less frequent than those with two because, following the selection of two 
attributes, the overall chance that no further attribute is added is higher than that an attribute 
is added. 
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General Discussion 
Evaluation of the Models 
As we mentioned in the Introduction, existing computational models are at odds with 
important aspects of the way in which people perform the conceptualization of referring 
expressions. In particular, evidence that speakers use a range of referring expressions in the 
same condition is inconsistent with deterministic computational models such as the full 
brevity, greedy and incremental algorithms, while the rational speech act theory currently 
does not deal with overspecification. Taking into account that human speakers are non-
deterministic and frequently overspecify, we therefore developed new models and tested 
them in three reference production experiments. 
 To account for the inherently probabilistic nature of reference production, we modified 
the original incremental algorithm to make it non-deterministic. Unlike in the original 
algorithm, where the preference order of attributes is fixed, we postulated that speakers are 
most likely to first select the attribute that is most preferred, but sometimes instead select the 
less preferred attribute, with the likelihood being determined by the relative preference for 
the two attributes. We tested two non-deterministic versions of the incremental algorithm. In 
the first version, probabilistic selection of attributes continues until all distractors are ruled 
out. However, this version failed to account for overspecification when all distinguishing 
attributes were fully distinguishing, because the selection of any distinguishing attribute 
causes the algorithm to stop. We therefore tested a second version according to which 
speakers probabilistically add further attributes even after a fully distinguishing description 
has been found. This model indeed provided a better overall fit of the data in Experiments 1 
and 2 than the first version, but in Experiment 3, it predicted too many descriptions with all 
three attributes and too few with a single attribute. 
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 Our results were more consistent with the predictions of the PRO model, a probabilistic 
model that assumes that attributes’ preferences as well as discriminatory power play a role in 
conceptualisation during reference production. It claims that speakers first choose the 
attribute that rules out all distractors. When more than one attribute is fully discriminating, 
they probabilistically choose one depending on its preference. Next, they add further 
attributes depending on the degree to which each of these is preferred and on speakers’ 
eagerness to overspecify. Across experiments, PRO made accurate predictions about the 
proportions with which different referring expressions were used in the conditions.  
 The excellent fit of PRO cannot be explained by the number of free parameters in the 
model. First, the parameter values in each condition were fixed on the basis of the data from 
the other conditions so they were not truly free. Second, versions of the non-deterministic IA 
that had the same number of parameters as PRO made less good predictions. In Experiments 
1 and 2, we tested the modified non-deterministic IA with an overspecification parameter, but 
its predictions were less good than PRO. In Experiment 3, PRO had the same number of 
parameters as the modified non-deterministic IA, because the overspecification parameter 
value was independently obtained from Experiment 1. 
 The main conclusion we can draw from our PRO modelling results is that it is possible 
to develop an algorithmic model of reference that mimics human reference production very 
closely, much more closely than classic reference generation algorithms of the 1990s and 
current versions of the rational speech act theory. The success of the model comes from 
making crucial aspects of the algorithm probabilistic and taking into account both the 
preference of attributes and a form of discriminatory power. PRO can be seen as a synthesis 
between the classic 1990s algorithms and the rational speech act theory. From earlier 
reference generation algorithms, it borrows the ideas that some attributes are intrinsically 
more preferred than others and that discriminatory power plays a role. From the rational 
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speech act theory, it borrows the ideas of probabilistic generation and discriminatory power. 
By combining these ideas in a unique way, PRO makes accurate predictions about human 
reference production. 
 The complexity of the formulas in the PRO algorithm (especially for longer 
expressions and conditions where several attributes are fully distinguishing, as in Experiment 
3) might seem at odds with the fluency with which human speakers usually produce 
reference. The reason that the formulas are so complex is that PRO predicts averaged 
probabilities of referring expressions across multiple speakers and items using multiple routes 
through the decision trees. However, on each individual trial, the referring process is much 
simpler because averaged probabilities need not be calculated. Rather, the process of 
producing reference can be seen as throwing a biased dice at each point in the decision tree 
that determines whether they will follow one route or another. This can be a simple, fast 
process for human speakers. 
 Although PRO can boast a considerable degree of empirical adequacy, one might argue 
that this achievement is bought at the expense of the attractive simplicity possessed by such 
models as the greedy algorithm and the rational speech act theory. An interesting question 
from this perspective is what the origins of the attribute preference and overspecification 
parameters in PRO are. Why do speakers prefer certain attributes over others and why does 
the likelihood of overspecification depend on the type of speaker and her task? Regarding 
attribute preference, it seems plausible that this is affected by how easy it is to detect 
differences in this attribute. Belke and Meyer (2002) found that participants detected 
differences in colour between two objects faster than differences in size. They suggested that 
this may be because colour is an absolute attribute, that is, it can be determined independently 
of the colour of other objects, whereas size is a relative attribute that can generally only be 
determined by comparing it to other objects in the context. However, we have recently found 
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that colour is not always preferred to size in reference production (Van Gompel, Gatt, 
Krahmer, & Van Deemter, 2014): When the difference in size between the target and 
distractors is sufficiently large, speakers use size as often as colour. This is more consistent 
with the idea that attribute preferences are due to their perceptual saliency rather than the 
distinction between relative and absolute attributes.  
 Other factors may also affect attribute preference. For example, Goudbeek and 
Krahmer (2012) found that the use of specific attributes in object descriptions could be 
primed: Speakers used an attribute more often when they had just heard a referential 
description with this attribute than when they had not (e.g., they said “the fan facing left” 
more often after hearing “the front-facing chair” than “the red chair”). This finding suggests 
that in addition to perceptual saliency, the conceptual saliency of attributes (due to priming) 
also affects their preference. This may also explain why Westerbeek, Koolen, and Maes 
(2015) and Rubio-Fernandez (2016) found that speakers mentioned colour more often when 
it was an atypical attribute of the object (e.g., a pink banana): Atypical colours are 
conceptually incongruent and may therefore be more salient than typical colours. 
 The overspecification parameter is likely to be affected by speakers’ cooperativeness 
with the listener: As Arts et al. (2011) and Rubio-Fernandez (2016) observed, when it is 
particularly important that the listener correctly identifies the object because it is critical for 
his task, speakers tend to overspecify more. Time pressure (cf., Horton & Keysar, 1996) and 
the complexity of the domain (Koolen et al., 2013; Paraboni and Van Deemter, 2014) may 
also affect how often speakers overspecify. The amount of overspecification also appears to 
depend on the type of speaker. As we mentioned before, Deutsch and Pechmann (1982) 
found that children overspecified less often than adults. It is possible that this speaker effect 
reflects cooperativeness: Certain speakers such as children may be less cooperative with the 
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listener than other speakers (Fukumura, 2016; Matthews, Lieven, Theakston, & Tomasello, 
2006). 
 
Future directions 
Because there is an almost unlimited number of target attributes and different distractors in 
the real word, speakers’ ability to refer potentially faces an infinite number of possible 
situations. Since our decision trees do not cover all possible inputs (e.g., where there are more 
than three distinguishing attributes or where there is no single fully distinguishing attribute), 
they are not a complete algorithm. In Appendix 1, we show the “complete” PRO algorithm, 
which is defined under a much wider class of possible situations; since the algorithm is 
under-determined by the available experimental data, it contains an element of extrapolation. 
The algorithm is only complete under certain assumptions: for example, it only deals with 
one-shot descriptions to singular objects (as opposed to sets), so it does not yet account for 
repeated reference and the use of anaphora. In future, PRO may be extended to cover an even 
wider class of situations. 
 Many features of the PRO algorithm remain untested. For example, our experiments 
tested situations with only two distractors. When there are many distractors, speakers may not 
keep all information in their focus of attention. As a result, the first stage in PRO, where 
speakers choose a fully distinguishing property, may become probabilistic: Although a 
property may not rule out all distractors, speakers may sometimes first choose it because it 
rules out all distractors in their current attention. Speakers may also ignore a fully 
discriminating property during the first stage because they may sometimes fail to check 
whether it has discriminatory power. Additional mechanisms may be called for. For example, 
it might be that speakers only take into account distractors and their attributes if they have 
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fixated them; PRO could deal with this by postulating that only these distractors and 
attributes are in the attentional domain. 
 Another question is which attributes are considered for inclusion in the referring 
expression. We have implicitly assumed that PRO only selects attributes that distinguish the 
target from at least one of the distractors. For instance, it cannot generate expressions like 
“grey candle with the flame” for the situations in Fig. 2, because “with the flame” does not 
discriminate the target from any of the distractors. This prediction was generally borne out by 
the data from our experiments. The only exception was the use of the type attribute in 
Experiment 1, where it did not rule out any distractors: Participants used this in 88% of their 
English descriptions and 93% of their Dutch descriptions. (In Experiment 2, PRO can explain 
the occurrence of references with type because in that experiment, type ruled out at least one 
distractor. In Experiment 3, participants were instructed not to omit the noun.)  
 One possible solution for this problem would be to assume that, as it stands, PRO 
focuses on discriminating attributes, but that later processes can add attributes that do not rule 
out any distractors, subject to the preference for this attribute (so type would be added 
relatively often). A different solution would be to assume that the decision trees of PRO 
(Figs. 4 and 11) should include not just colour, size and border, but also type. We did not test 
whether this would account for the use of the type attribute, because it would have resulted in 
another parameter, type preference, and this would have resulted in too many parameters for 
the number of data points (i.e. conditions and types of expressions) we had. The inclusion of 
another attribute, such as type, to the model would not change the relative proportions with 
which the descriptions including colour, size and border are used; the only thing that changes 
is that the model would sometimes generate these descriptions with and sometimes without 
the additional attribute. 
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 As described, PRO and the other computational models we have discussed are 
conceptualisation or content determination models. They were not designed to account for 
word order preferences, for example, whether speakers say “large grey candle” or “grey large 
candle”. In line with most language production models, we have assumed that speakers in our 
experiments first determined which concepts to express, and following this, they accessed the 
lexical properties of the words for these concepts and put the words in order during the 
realisation stage (e.g., Bock & Levelt, 1994; Dell, 1986; Levelt et al., 1999).  
 PRO’s strict separation between conceptualisation and realisation may suggest that 
speakers put all concepts that they select into a memory buffer before they lexicalise them 
and put them in order. In our experiments, this seems plausible, because there was little word 
order variation: For example, speakers virtually always produced size before colour in 
Experiments 1 and 3. Although in theory, it is possible that speakers always conceptualised 
size before colour and put the words in the same order as they accessed the concepts, this 
seems unlikely given that colour was preferred over size. Furthermore, in the colour-only 
conditions, colour was fully discriminatory, whereas size was not. Thus, it seems plausible 
that at least in some cases, speakers accessed the concept for colour first and kept it in a 
conceptual buffer until they had accessed the size concept. It is likely that this also happened 
in Experiment 2, where colour was produced before type even though type is more preferred. 
In sum, when properties have a rigid word order, speakers often appear to hold concepts in a 
buffer before they order them. 
 However, when word order is more flexible, the order in which concepts are selected 
may affect their order of mention. Fukumura (2018) investigated the ordering of colour and 
pattern (green spotted bow vs. spotted green bow), where both word orders are relatively 
common. She found that both discriminability and attribute preference affected word order, 
suggesting that speakers may immediately have lexicalised the property that was 
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conceptualised first, rather than holding it into a buffer. If the latter is true, PRO should also 
make predictions about word order in such cases; it would be interesting to explore this in 
future work. 
 Finally, PRO is currently neutral with regard to whether speakers select particular 
attributes because they are allocentric, in order to help the listener identify the target, or 
egocentric, selecting attributes that are easiest for themselves to produce (e.g., Brennan & 
Clark, 1996; Brown & Dell, 1987; Heller, Gorman, & Tanenhaus, 2012; Horton & Keysar, 
1996; Fukumura & Van Gompel, 2012; Wardlow-Lane & Ferreira, 2008). For example, 
speakers may first choose a fully discriminating attribute because the fact that it rules out all 
distractors makes it most helpful for the listener. Alternatively, they may first choose a fully 
discriminating attribute because this target attribute is most contrastive and therefore 
perceptually most salient for themselves. Similarly, speakers may prefer one attribute over 
another because they assume it is perceptually or conceptually more salient for the listener 
(and therefore more helpful) or because it is more salient for themselves. PRO is compatible 
with either type of account. 
 In sum, we hope to have demonstrated that computational models of reference 
generation can be useful models of human reference production and conceptualisation, 
because they make explicit quantitative predictions that can be tested in psycholinguistic 
experiments. We see the PRO model, and the manner in which we have tested its quantitative 
predictions, as the start of a new avenue of research. We have shown that PRO provides an 
excellent fit to our current data, but more experimental work is needed to test more of PRO’s 
assumptions and predictions. This should result in an even better understanding of human 
reference production, and in even more accurate and more general reference production 
algorithms.  
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2 Here and elsewhere, we refer to colour and size as attributes, while “red” and “small” 
(values of respectively the colour and size attributes) are properties of an object. 
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Table 1: Formulas of the models in Experiment 1.  
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 description 
 colour and size colour-only size-only 
 
Non-deterministic incremental algorithm 
colour-or-size condition 0 c 1–c 
size-only condition c 0 1–c 
colour-only condition 1–c c 0 
 
Modified non-deterministic incremental algorithm 
colour-or-size condition c*(1–c)+(1–c)*c c*c (1–c)*(1–c) 
size-only condition c+(1–c)*c 0 (1–c)*(1–c) 
colour-only condition c*(1–c)+1–c c*c 0 
 
PRO 
colour-or-size condition c*(1–c+e)+(1–c)*(c+e) c*(c–e) (1–c)*(1–c–e) 
size-only condition 1*(c+e)  0 1*(1–c–e) 
colour-only condition 1*(1–c+e) 1*(c–e) 0 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  
Table
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Table 2: Parameter values for the predictions in each language (Experiment 1). 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 English Dutch 
 c e c e 
Non-deterministic incremental algorithm 
colour-or-size condition  .8799  .8389 
size-only condition  .9376  .9240 
colour-only condition  .8916  .8381 
 
Modified non-deterministic incremental algorithm 
colour-or-size condition  .8454  .7969 
size-only condition  .9180  .8944 
colour-only condition  .7867  .7164 
 
PRO 
colour-or-size condition .8777 –.0449 .8360 –.0786 
size-only condition .8473 –.0789 .8122 –.0911 
colour-only condition .8664 –.0510 .8161 –.0631 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3: Model testing results for Experiment 1. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 p(data|model) BIC 
English 
 Non-deterministic IA 4.70*10–179 826.16 
 Modified non-deterministic IA 1.43*10–103 480.55 
 PRO  2.99*10–12 66.93 
 
Dutch 
 Non-deterministic IA 1.35*10–239 1106.91 
 Modified non-deterministic IA 1.16*10–135 628.28 
 PRO  7.56*10–9 51.14 
___________________________________________________________________________  
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Table 4: Formulas of the models in Experiment 2. 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 description 
 type and colour type-only colour-only 
 
Non-deterministic incremental algorithm 
type-or-colour condition c 1–c 0 
type-only condition c 1–c 0 
colour-only condition 1 0 0 
 
Modified non-deterministic incremental algorithm 
type-or-colour condition c*(1–c)+(1-c)*c (1–c)*(1–c) c*c 
type-only condition c+(1–c)*c (1–c)*(1–c) 0 
colour-only condition c*(1–c)+1–c 0 c*c 
 
PRO 
type-or-colour condition c*(1–c+e)+(1–c)*(c+e) (1–c)*(1–c–e) c*(c–e) 
type-only condition 1*(c+e) 1*(1–c–e) 0 
colour-only condition 1*(1–c+e) 0 1*(c–e) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 5: Parameter values for the predictions in each language (Experiment 2). 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 parameter values used for predictions 
 English Dutch 
 c e c e 
 
Non-deterministic IA 
type-or-colour condition .6864 .7493 
type-only condition .5141 .6399 
colour-only condition .6003 .6955 
 
Modified non-deterministic IA 
type-or-colour condition .8086 .8437 
type-only condition .7523 .7949 
colour-only condition .7875 .8321 
 
PRO 
type-or-colour condition .8136 .1272 .8497 .1004 
type-only condition .8068 .1451 .8166 .0604 
colour-only condition .7935 .1508 .8398 .0953 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 6: Model testing results for Experiment 2. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 p(data|model) BIC 
English 
 Non-deterministic IA 4.89*10–69 321.54 
 Modified non-deterministic IA 1.37*10–21 103.03 
 PRO  8.25*10–7 41.93 
 
Dutch 
 Non-deterministic IA 1.57*10–64 330.77 
 Modified non-deterministic IA 6.95*10–20 95.15 
 PRO  2.42*10–17 90.43 
___________________________________________________________________________  
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Table 7: Parameter values for the predictions in Experiment 3. 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
 parameter values used for predictions 
 c s 
Modified non-deterministic IA 
colour-only condition .6145 .1283 
size-only condition .6557 .0860 
border-only condition .6814 .1316 
colour-or-size condition .6241 .1195 
colour-or-border condition .6209 .1246 
size-or-border condition .6817 .0907 
colour-size-or-border condition .6306 .1178 
 
PRO 
colour-only condition .6633 .1130 
size-only condition .6596 .1115 
border-only condition .6583 .1144 
colour-or-size condition .6592 .1160 
colour-or-border condition .6437 .1103 
size-or-border condition .6591 .0910 
colour-size-or-border condition .6450 .1131 
_______________________________________________________________ 
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Fig. 1: Three brooms; the target broom is circled. Note that both colour and size distinguish 
the target from its distractors. The colours of the objects are indicated in brackets. 
 
  
(grey) 
(green) 
(red) 
Figure
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a. Either colour or size fully distinguishes the target from the distractors. 
 
b. Only size fully distinguishes the target from the distractors. 
 
c. Only colour fully distinguishes the target from the distractors. 
 
Fig. 2: Three examples of a target (circled) and distractors. The colours of the objects are 
indicated in brackets; participants saw the actual colours, not the words in brackets. 
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Fig. 3: Modified non-deterministic IA decision tree for the conditions in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 4: PRO decision tree for the conditions in Fig. 2. 
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Fig. 5: Observed results and model predictions for Experiment 1. C = colour-only descriptions, S = size-only 
descriptions, CS = colour-and-size descriptions. 
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a. Either type or colour fully distinguishes the target from the distractors.  
 
b. Only colour fully distinguishes the target from the distractors. 
 
 
c. Only type fully distinguishes the target from the distractors. 
 
Fig. 6: Three examples of a target (circled) and distractors in Experiment 2. The colours of 
the objects are indicated in brackets; participants saw the actual colours, not the words in 
brackets. 
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Fig. 7: Observed results and model predictions for Experiment 2. C = colour-only descriptions, T = type-only 
descriptions, TC = type-and-colour descriptions. 
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a. Only colour fully distinguishes the target from the distractors.  
 
b. Only size fully distinguishes the target from the distractors.  
 
c. Only border fully distinguishes the target from the distractors.  
 
d. Both colour and size fully distinguish the target from the distractors. 
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e. Both colour and border fully distinguish the target from the distractors. 
 
f. Both size and border fully distinguish the target from the distractors.  
 
g. Colour, size or border all fully distinguish the target from the distractors. 
 
Fig. 8. Seven examples of a target (indicated by an arrow) and distractors. The colours of the 
objects are indicated in brackets; participants saw the actual colours, not the words. 
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Fig. 9: Observed results and model predictions for Experiment 3. C = colour-only 
descriptions, S = size-only descriptions, B = border-only descriptions, CS = colour-and-size 
descriptions, CB = colour-and-border descriptions, SB = size-and-border descriptions, CSB = 
colour-size-and-border descriptions.  
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Fig. 10. Modified non-deterministic IA decision tree for the colour-only condition (Fig. 8a) in 
Experiment 3. 
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Fig. 11. PRO decision tree for the conditions in Fig. 8.
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Appendix 1: PRO algorithm 
 
Input: A domain of objects, containing a target referent r and a non-empty set M of 
distractors. A set A of attributes true of r, each of which is false for at least one distractor in 
M. Furthermore, for each attribute, a probability that reflects the Preference degree 
associated with the attribute (this is to inform P-choose); and a probability that determines 
the likelihood of overspecification (this is to inform R-choose; details below). 
 
Output: If a distinguishing description of r (given A and M) exists then the algorithm returns 
one of these as the value of D. 
 
1: if some property in A individually suffices to remove all distractors then 
2:         P-choose one such property, for example P  
3:         D := {P}  
4: while True do 
5:         if A = empty then  
6:         return D 
7:         else if D is not distinguishing yet then  
8:                       P-choose a property from A  
9:                       update D, A, and M  
10:               else  
11:                    R-choose between STOP and the n properties remaining in A  
                          (making n+1 options in total) 
12:                    if a further property is chosen then 
13:                         Update D, A, and M 
14:                    else  
15:                         return D 
 
 
The PRO algorithm, sketched in pseudo-code above, iterates through a number of steps, each 
of which either adds an attribute or none at all. The algorithm has two phases. The first phase 
(lines 1-3) checks whether there is one single attribute that is able to identify the referent; if 
there is, then such an attribute is included in the description. If there is more than one 
attribute that is fully discriminatory, then one is probabilistically included into the description 
(P-choose, line 2). P-choose (short for Property-choose) is the function that selects properties 
probabilistically, in proportion to their relative degree of preference. P-choose uses p – 1 
preference values, where p is the number of fully distinguishing attributes (that have not yet 
been included in the description). For example, there is one preference value in the colour-or-
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size condition of Experiment 1 (c) and two in the colour-size-or-border condition of 
Experiment 3 (c and s). The preference values are normalised over all fully distinguishing 
attributes, so in the colour-or-size condition of Experiment 3, the colour preference is c/(c+s) 
and the size preference is s/(c+s) (border is not fully distinguishing in this condition).  
The second phase of the algorithm (lines 4-15) takes place whether or not the first 
phase has found an attribute to include: Either way, this second phase keeps looking for 
opportunities to include (further) attributes in the description (line 4) until a description is 
returned. A is the set of all available properties that hold true of the referent r but are false for 
at least one distractor; A shrinks as properties are added to the set of properties D that is 
generated. M is the set of distractors, which likewise gets smaller. If there are no remaining 
properties left in A (a situation that did not occur in our experiments), then the description D 
cannot be updated and the algorithm outputs D (lines 5-6).  
If D does not yet distinguish the target from all distractors, then another attribute is 
added, with the probability determined by its preference value (lines 7-9). As before, P-
choose uses p – 1 preference values, where p is the number of remaining distinguishing 
attributes and the preference values are normalised over these attributes. As a result of the 
“while True” loop (line 4), there may be several iterations of P-choose before the attributes 
fully distinguish the target from the distractors. If D is distinguishing, then the algorithm 
probabilistically chooses either to stop and return D, or to add a further attribute (lines 11-
15). The decision to stop or continue is determined by R-Choose (short for Redundancy-
choose), which reflects both an attribute’s preference and the speaker’s overspecification 
eagerness.  
Updating D, A and M: Whenever a property P is chosen, then D is updated by adding 
P as an element of D; A is updated by removing P from A (because it is no longer available); 
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and M is updated by intersecting M with the set of all domain objects for which the property 
is true (i.e., by removing distractors). 
R-Choose uses r – 1 preference values, with r being the number of remaining 
attributes that rule out at least one distractor. Again, because of the “while True” loop, the 
algorithm may go through several iterations of R-Choose. As explained in Experiment 3, 
during each iteration, the probability of adding a particular attribute (e.g., colour, size or 
border) is the probability of adding any attribute multiplied by the preference value for that 
particular attribute normalised over all remaining attributes. 
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Appendix 2: Formulas used in Experiment 3 
 
Modified non-deterministic IA 
 
Colour-only condition 
 
C = c*c 
CS = c*s*(c+s)+s*(c/(1-s))*(c+s) 
CB = c*(1-c-s)*(1-s)+(1-c-s)*(c/(c+s))*(1-s) 
CSB = c*s*(1-c-s)+c*(1-c-s)*s+s*(c/(1-s))*(1-c-s)+s*((1-c-s)/(1-s))*1+(1-c-
s)*(c/(c+s))*s+(1-c-s)*(s/(c+s))*1 
 
Size-only condition 
 
S = s*s 
CS = c*(s/(1-c))*(c+s)+s*c*(c+s) 
SB = s*(1-c-s)*(1-c)+(1-c-s)*(s/(c+s))*(1-c) 
CSB = c*(s/(1-c))*(1-c-s)+c*((1-c-s)/(1-c))*1+s*c*(1-c-s)+s*(1-c-s)*c+(1-c-
s)*(c/(c+s))*1+(1-c-s)*(s/(c+s))*c 
 
Border-only condition 
 
B = (1-c-s)*(1-c-s) 
CB = (1-c-s)*c*(1-s)+c*((1-c-s)/(1-c))*(1-s) 
SB = (1-c-s)*s*(1-c)+s*((1-c-s)/(1-s))*(1-c) 
CSB = c*(s/(1-c))*1+c*((1-c-s)/(1-c))*s+ s*(c/(1-s))*1+s*((1-c-s)/(1-s))*c+(1-c-s)*s*c+(1-c-
s)*c*s 
 
Colour-or-size condition 
 
C = c*c 
S = s*s 
CS = c*s*(c+s)+s*c*(c+s) 
CB = c*(1-c-s)*(1-s)+(1-c-s)*(c/(c+s))*(1-s) 
SB = s*(1-c-s)*(1-c)+(1-c-s)*(s/(c+s))*(1-c) 
CSB = c*s*(1-c-s)+c*(1-c-s)*s+s*c*(1-c-s)+s*(1-c-s)*c+(1-c-s)*(c/(c+s))*s+(1-c-
s)*(s/(c+s))*c 
 
Colour-or-border condition 
 
C = c*c 
B = (1-c-s)*(1-c-s) 
CS = c*s*(c+s)+s*(c/(1-s))*(c+s) 
CB = c*(1-c-s)*(1-s)+(1-c-s)*c*(1-s) 
SB = s*((1-c-s)/(1-s))*(1-c)+(1-c-s)*s*(1-c) 
CSB = c*s*(1-c-s)+c*(1-c-s)*s+s*(c/(1-s))*(1-c-s)+s*((1-c-s)/(1-s))*c+(1-c-s)*s*c+(1-c-
s)*c*s 
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Size-or-border condition 
 
S = s*s 
B = (1-c-s)*(1-c-s) 
CS = c*(s/(1-c))*(c+s)+s*c*(c+s) 
CB = c*((1-c-s)/(1-c))*(1-s)+(1-c-s)*c*(1-s) 
SB = s*(1-c-s)*(1-c)+(1-c-s)*s*(1-c) 
CSB = c*(s/(1-c))*(1-c-s)+c*((1-c-s)/(1-c))*s+s*c*(1-c-s)+s*(1-c-s)*c+(1-c-s)*c*s+(1-c-
s)*s*c 
 
Colour-size-or-border condition 
 
C = c*c 
S = s*s 
B = (1-c-s)*(1-c-s) 
CS = c*s*(c+s)+s*c*(c+s) 
CB = c*(1-c-s)*(1-s)+(1-c-s)*c*(1-s) 
SB = s*(1-c-s)*(1-c)+(1-c-s)*s*(1-c) 
CSB = c*s*(1-c-s)+c*(1-c-s)*s+s*c*(1-c-s)+s*(1-c-s)*c+(1-c-s)*c*s+(1-c-s)*s*c 
 
PRO 
 
Colour-only condition 
 
C = (c-e) 
CS = (1-c+e)*(s/(1-c))*(c+s-e) 
CB = (1-c+e)*((1-c-s)/(1-c))*(1-s-e) 
CSB = (1-c+e)*(s/(1-c))*(1-c-s+e)+(1-c+e)*((1-c-s)/(1-c))*(s+e) 
 
Size-only condition 
 
S = (s-e) 
CS = (1-s+e)*(c/(1-s))*(c+s-e) 
SB = (1-s+e)*((1-c-s)/(1-s))*(1-c-e) 
CSB = (1-s+e)*(c/(1-s))*(1-c-s+e)+(1-s+e)*((1-c-s)/(1-s))*(c+e) 
 
Border-only condition 
 
B = (1-c-s-e) 
CB = (c+s+e)*(c/(c+s))*(1-s-e) 
SB = (c+s+e)*(s/(c+s))*(1-c-e) 
CSB = (c+s+e)*(c/(c+s))*(s+e)+(c+s+e)*(s/(c+s))*(c+e) 
 
Colour-or-size condition 
 
C = (c/(c+s))*(c-e) 
S = (s/(c+s))*(s-e) 
CS = (c/(c+s))*(1-c+e)*(s/(1-c))*(c+s-e)+(s/(c+s))*(1-s+e)*(c/(1-s))*(c+s-e) 
CB = (c/(c+s))*(1-c+e)*((1-c-s)/(1-c))*(1-s-e) 
SB = (s/(c+s))*(1-s+e)*((1-c-s)/(1-s))*(1-c-e) 
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CSB = (c/(c+s))*(1-c+e)*(s/(1-c))*(1-c-s+e)+(c/(c+s))*(1-c+e)*((1-c-s)/(1-
c))*(s+e)+(s/(c+s))*(1-s+e)*(c/(1-s))*(1-c-s+e)+(s/(c+s))*(1-s+e)*((1-c-s)/(1-s))*(c+e) 
 
Colour-or-border condition 
 
C = (c/(1-s))*(c-e) 
B = ((1-c-s)/(1-s))*(1-c-s-e) 
CS = (c/(1-s))*(1-c+e)*(s/(1-c))*(c+s-e) 
CB = (c/(1-s))*(1-c+e)*((1-c-s)/(1-c))*(1-s-e)+((1-c-s)/(1-s))*(c+s+e)*(c/(c+s))*(1-s-e) 
SB = ((1-c-s)/(1-s))*(c+s+e)*(s/(c+s))*(1-c-e) 
CSB = (c/(1-s))*(1-c+e)*(s/(1-c))*(1-c-s+e)+(c/(1-s))*(1-c+e)*((1-c-s)/(1-c))*(s+e)+((1-c-
s)/(1-s))*(c+s+e)*(c/(c+s))*(s+e)+((1-c-s)/(1-s))*(c+s+e)*(s/(c+s))*(c+e) 
 
Size-or-border condition 
 
S = (s/(1-c))*(s-e) 
B = ((1-c-s)/(1-c))*(1-c-s-e) 
CS = (s/(1-c))*(1-s+e)*(c/(1-s))*(c+s-e) 
CB = ((1-c-s)/(1-c))*(c+s+e)*(c/(c+s))*(1-s-e) 
SB = (s/(1-c))*(1-s+e)*((1-c-s)/(1-s))*(1-c-e)+((1-c-s)/(1-c))*(c+s+e)*(s/(c+s))*(1-c-e) 
CSB = (s/(1-c))*(1-s+e)*(c/(1-s))*(1-c-s+e)+(s/(1-c))*(1-s+e)*((1-c-s)/(1-s))*(c+e)+((1-c-
s)/(1-c))*(c+s+e)*(c/(c+s))*(s+e)+((1-c-s)/(1-c))*(c+s+e)*(s/(c+s))*(c+e) 
 
Colour-size-or-border condition 
 
C = c*(c-e) 
S = s*(s-e) 
B = (1-c-s)*(1-c-s-e) 
CS = c*(1-c+e)*(s/(1-c))*(c+s-e)+s*(1-s+e)*(c/(1-s))*(c+s-e) 
CB = c*(1-c+e)*((1-c-s)/(1-c))*(1-s-e)+(1-c-s)*(c+s+e)*(c/(c+s))*(1-s-e) 
SB = s*(1-s+e)*((1-c-s)/(1-s))*(1-c-e)+(1-c-s)*(c+s+e)*(s/(c+s))*(1-c-e) 
CSB = c*(1-c+e)*(s/(1-c))*(1-c-s+e)+c*(1-c+e)*((1-c-s)/(1-c))*(s+e)+s*(1-s+e)*(c/(1-
s))*(1-c-s+e)+s*(1-s+e)*((1-c-s)/(1-s))*(c+e)+(1-c-s)*(c+s+e)*(c/(c+s))*(s+e)+(1-c-
s)*(c+s+e)*(s/(c+s))*(c+e) 
 
 
